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A WAR LIKE NO OTHER,  
VICTOR DAVIS HANSON  
 
By Marcus D. McCormick 
 
In A War Like No Other, Victor Davis Hanson attempts to answer 
the age old questions of the Peloponnesian war—Why did the war begin? 
What is the nature of empire? What caused Athens to fall, and the 
Peloponnesian coalition to prevail? Hanson posits that the war was 
revolutionary, and redefined Greek understanding of the world. A War Like 
No Other is topical in nature. Each section describes a certain element in the 
war, and how that particular element continued to shape the mind of the late 
5th century Greeks. However, the true value of A War Like No Other, just as 
Thucydides intended for his history of the war to be, lies in Hanson’s grasp of 
the past as a tool for interpreting and understanding the present. Hanson’s 
comparison of the successes and blunders of the classical archetype to 
modern iterations enables a more complete appreciation of the History of the 
Peloponnesian War.  
Thucydides’ History of the Peloponnesian War has been and is the 
primary source for knowledge of the conflict of Sparta and imperial Athens in 
the late 5th century B.C. Thucydides gives some biographical detail through 
the course of his work, and recounts his experience as the plague ravaged 
Periclean Athens (430 BC), his commission that he served at Amphipolis 
(424 BC), and the resulting exile after his he failed in delivering the besieged 
Athenians and allies there before the counter-attack of Brasidas.1 From then 
on, Thucydides wandered through his time in exile, and thereby compiled his 
work with the purpose of it being “a possession for all time.”2 The History of 
the Peloponnesian War ends abruptly with Thucydides’ death (411 BC), but 
Xenophon resumes the narrative in his Hellenica.  
A War Like No Other divides easily into two parts—the first part is 
the intellectual frame of the work, whereas the second is thematic analysis of 
the war. In the introduction and conclusion to the work, Hanson frames the 
                                                             
1 In regards to the plague and Thucydides’ experience, see Thucydides, 
History of The Peloponnesian War, Finley Jr., John H., ed. (New York: Random 
House, 1951): 110-113; Thucydides describes his exile and command later on 264-
266.  
2 Thucydides, 14-15; “In fine, I have written my work, not as an essay 
which is to win the applause of the moment, but as a possession for all time.” 
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body of his work with his overarching aim of answering the deeper questions 
about the nature of the Peloponnesian war, why the war occurred, and what 
outcomes the war provided. Hanson renames the “Peloponnesian War” as the 
“Great Ancient Greek Civil War,” with the reason that the conflict was not 
merely an Athenian war against the Peloponnesians. Instead, Hanson argues 
the conflict was an engagement between two differing views for the future of 
the Hellenic people. The first chapter of the book, entitled “Fear,” discusses 
the reasons for which the Peloponnesians and their allies felt compelled to 
take up arms, and how Athens, from the end of the Persian wars, had 
established itself as the antithesis to an older and more conservative mode of 
Greek thinking. Athens had moved beyond existing as an individual and 
independent city state—the Peloponnesian ideal of Hellenic existence—and 
had chosen to “grasp continually after something further”, thereby 
ascertaining dominion over others following the Persian invasions, as well as 
imperial power.3 The final chapters review the fatal “Climax” and “Ruin?” 
and follow the occupation of Athens and the establishment of the Thirty 
Tyrants—the dissolution of the Athenian empire. Hanson reflects on the final 
days, and concludes that while the end of the war and the close of the 5th 
century both were a substantiation of much loss, ruin, and bloodshed, the 
legacy of the war is the precedent of imperial warfare rather than the end of 
imperial splendor.  
The second part of A War Like No Other is a thematic presentation 
of the Peloponnesian war, describing how the war played out. Hanson 
describes in seven chapters the elements which he believes to be unique in 
their manifestation in the war. This method of recounting the war focus less 
on narrative and instead on the cultural, tactical, and strategic elements which 
span the course of the conflict. Hanson’s first chapters, “Fire,” “Disease,” and 
“Terror” recount the war in a more chronological way, similar to the 
sequence of summer and winter campaigns that one becomes familiar with 
when reading Thucydides by describing elements that are prominent as the 
war begins. The later chapters, “Armor,” “Walls,” “Horses,” and “Ships,” 
describe more the ubiquitous characteristics of the war, drawing elements 
from the early stages and final stages alike. To Hanson, the cataclysmic effect 
of these elements on the Greeks was akin to the way in which the First World 
War transformed the nations of the early 20th century. The technology and 
means of making war in 1914 were not entirely novel, but the already 
                                                             
3 Thucydides, 118. 
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familiar means evolved significantly throughout the war. They not only 
changed the way that the war manifested on the ground, but also the way that 
the war lasted in the memories of its combatants. The horrible images of 
trenches and long drawn out sieges and battles, of terrifying ravages of 
trench-born disease and unconventional weapons, all reflect events such as 
the plague in Athens, or the quagmire at Potidaea and Amphipolis, or 
familiarity with mass death during the Peloponnesian War.  
This benefit of tangible modern application is the most apparent 
benefit of A War Like No Other. Hanson draws comparisons to the Cold War 
specifically, for its lessened amount of decisive and conventional warfare, 
and for the importance of proxies, allies, and extended conflict over strategic 
points for either side. Hanson’s comparison to the Cold War is particularly 
potent as he underscores the divide between the two political factions in 
Greece—the oligarchic Spartans and democratic Athenians as compared to 
the antithetical powers of the Soviet and American states.4 However, the 
comparison does not stand true in all cases. Hanson acknowledges that wars 
like the Second World War are not quite as comparable due to their direct 
action and decisive battles5.  
Another strength which Hanson uses to his advantage is his 
understanding of the actual setting of the war. The sites of the battles, sieges, 
or cities, which Hanson has visited himself imbues his description with 
greater vibrancy. The chapter entitled “Horses,” would be left sorrowfully 
unsupported if not supplemented with a comparative knowledge of the 
topography of mainland Greece and the Sicilian plains. Sicily, instead of 
being a mountainous landscape similar to Boeotia, Epirus, or the 
Peloponnesus, was an “island whose wide plains and greenery were more like 
the landscape of Thessaly.”
6
  As the Athenians embarked on their expedition, 
their commander, Nicias, understood that horsemen would be needed for the 
campaign. However, upon arrival in Sicily, the Athenians discovered that it 
was not enough to field horsemen—mounted supremacy was essential to 
keeping open lines of communication and conduct a successful siege. In the 
same way, passages which deal with specific events like Delium and 
Mantinea are enhanced beyond the detail provided by Thucydides when 
Hanson compares and contrasts the battlefield with the modern Greek 
4 Victor Davis Hanson, A War Like No Other (New York: Random House, 
2005), 90-91. 
5 Hanson, 4-6. 
6 Ibid., 208. 
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landscape. At Mantinea Hanson describes the modern freeway that reflects 
the importance of the valley as a north-south highway in ancient times.  
Killing fields… surrounded by mountains that provide both 
defense for the flanks of heavy infantrymen and a refuge 
after defeat… Mantinea served as a choke point where the 
grand routes from southern Greece constrict to a mile or 
so—before opening up again to flatland and various roads 
that branch out northward to Argos, Corinth, and Athens.7  
In addition, Hanson’s agricultural knowledge enhances especially 
the chapter entitle “Fire.”8 When the Spartans first marched their grand 
coalition army into Attica in attempts to resolve the war by conventional 
means, they burnt and pillaged many of the surrounding estates in order to 
bring out the Athenians. Alongside telling the narrative, Hanson adds 
considerable commentary on why the tactic fails by explaining how very 
difficult it is to obliterate hinterland farms—particularly ones that are 
primarily devoted to the growing of olive trees, which are known for their 
regenerative powers—based on his own experience in clearing land.9 
One of the drawbacks to Hanson’s unique style is that, in giving the 
account of the Peloponnesian war in thematic segments, the chronology of 
the war becomes convoluted. Each of the chapters tends to run 
chronologically within themselves, but the cohesion between the events 
underscored in one chapter are often left unassociated with the others. For 
example, when in “Terror” numerous occasions of slaughter like after the 
sieges of Plataea and Mytilene are recorded from the beginning to the end of 
the war, they are repeated in a different order in chapters like “Walls” which 
deals with siegecraft. Because of the thematic organization of the work, the 
situations are sometimes inorganically separated events that follow them 
chronologically. However, the benefit of depth the thematic view offers 
outweighs this confusion.  
Hanson consults a healthy variety of sources that range from others’ 
chronological histories of the war to works like his own which compare the 
past to the modern. The works of Herman, McCann, and Strauss deal with the 
idea of western military tradition and the cycles of empire within Western 
                                                             
7 Hanson, 154. 
8 See also Hanson’s Warfare and Agriculture in Classical Greece, and 
Fields Without Dreams: Defending the Agrarian Idea.  
9 Hanson, 35-37; 55-57. 
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society, as well as the history of terror and violence in the history of the West. 
Hanson’s strengths lie manly in his gritty and detailed understanding of the 
warfare of the Greek world and thereby bringing to life the ancient narrative. 
The list of historiographic and surrounding ancient sources is rather thin, 
which reviewers like Paul Johnson have commented on and found somewhat 
distasteful—Hanson mentions this in the beginning portion of this book, 
stating that “straying from the strict protocols of classical scholarship may 
bother professional historians.”10 
A War Like No Other also connects the classical age with the post 
9/11 world. The chapter entitled “Fear” includes some explicit references to 
the event, but the true indicator is within the section entitled “Terror.”11 In 
“Fear,” the ways in which the Spartans regarded the Long Walls which 
Athens had constructed between its acropolis and the port city of Piraeus is 
similar to the way in which outsiders to the United States view the symbols of 
wealth and power within it—the World Trade Centers.12 However, Hanson 
uses “Terror” to describe the nature of atrocity in an increasingly globalized 
society. In the Peloponnesian War, Greece had begun a journey towards 
becoming a civilization with extended influence beyond just their own 
mainland in the Mediterranean, something that they had watched the Persian 
Empire stop just short of earlier that century. As the war carried on in earnest, 
acts of mass murder, looting, and terror became commonplace, and 
disoriented the Greek mind calmed itself by idealizing more ancient times 
when disputes were straightforward and settled through an honorable hoplite 
collision. Not only did these events occur, but they effected nearly all of the 
Hellenic world, everywhere to the sacred places, the major players, and, in 
Hanson’s terms, the “Greek Third World.” This sort of terror, known and 
heard of across the entire Greek world, reflects the modern situation with acts 
of terror. 
A War Like No Other presents itself well as an alternative thematic 
interpretation of the Peloponnesian War. The work could be well used in a 
Western Civilization or World Literature course in order to supplement either 
selected readings of Thucydides, accompany his work, or stand alone as a 
substitute. The real value of A War Like No Other is that it concerns itself 
10 Johnson, Paul, “Review: A War Like No Other,” New York Times Book 
Review 110, no. 43 (October, 2005): 15; Hanson, XVI. 
11 For the direct reference in “Fear” to the terrorist attacks on America on 
September 11, see Hanson, 3-4. 
12 Hanson, 26; 267. 
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with the idea that past history is important to the understanding of the present, 
and is a solid basis for the tracing of themes of warfare, empire, and politics 
in the Western world.
